The Lightly Manned Autonomous Combat Capability (LMACC) by Mun, Johnathan & Gallup, Shelley
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Faculty and Researchers' Publications
2020-06
The Lightly Manned Autonomous Combat
Capability (LMACC)
Mun, Johnathan; Gallup, Shelley
Mun, Johnathan C.; Gallup, Shelley (2020). The Lightly Manned Autonomous Combat
Capability (LMACC), Naval Engineers Journal, Volume 132, Number 2, pp. 101-118(18).
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/67437
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
Delivered by Ingenta
Date :   Tue, 15 Jun 2021 18:08:28 IP : 5.10.31.151
NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL June 2020 | No. 132-2 | 101
Architecture-Based Security for UxVs
REFERENCES
[1] “Th e Navy Unmanned Surface Vehicle 
(USV) Master Plan,” 23 July 2007. http://
www.navy.mil/navydata/technology/
usvmppr.pdf. 
[2] Luqi, “Control Systems for Unmanned 
Surface Vehicles in Anti-Submarine 
Warfare,” Technical Report NPS-CS-001R, 
2017. 
[3] S. Savitz et al., “U.S. Navy Employment 
Options for Unmanned Surface Vehicles 
(USVs),” RAND Corporation, 2013. http://
www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
research_reports/RR300/RR384/RAND_
RR384.pdf. 
[4] S. Fahey, “Soft ware Architecture for Anti-
Submarine Warfare Unmanned Surface 
Vehicles,” M.Sc. in Computer Science, 
NPS, September 2016.
[5] “ACTUV Christening Press 
Kit,” 2016. [Online]. https://
www.darpa.mil/attachments/
ACTUVChristeningPressKitPostEvent1.
zip. 
[6] V. Berzins, M. Rodriguez, and M. 
Wessman, “Putting Teeth into Open 
Architectures: Infrastructure for Reducing 
the Need for Retesting,” in Proceedings of 
the Fourth Annual Research Symposium—
Acquisition Research: Creating Synergy for 
Informed Change, pp. 285–312, 16–18 May 
2007. 
[7] V. Berzins, “Which Unchanged 
Components to Retest aft er a Technology 
Upgrade,” in Proceedings of the Fourth 
Annual Research Symposium—Acquisition 
Research: Creating Synergy for Informed 
Change, pp. 142–153, 14–15 May 2008. 
[8] V. Berzins and P. Dailey, “How to Check If 
It Is Safe Not to Retest a Component,” in 
Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Research 
Symposium—Acquisition Research: Defense 
Acquisition in Transition, pp. 189–200, 
12–14 May 2009. 
[9] V. Berzins and P. Dailey, “Improved 
Soft ware Testing for Open Architecture,” 
Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Research 
Symposium—Acquisition Research: Creating 
Synergy for Informed Change, pp. 385–398, 
11–13 May 2010. 
[10] V. Berzins, P. Lim, and M. B. Kahia, “Test 
Reduction in Open Architecture via 
Dependency Analysis,” in Proceedings of 
the Eighth Annual Acquisition Research 
Symposium, pp. 333–344, 11–12 May 2011. 
[11] V. Berzins, “Certifying Tools for Test 
Reduction in Open Architecture,” in 
Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Acquisition 
Research Symposium, 2012, Monterey, CA. 
[12] V. Berzins, “Combining Risk Analysis 
and Slicing for Test Reduction in Open 
Architecture,” in Proceedings of the 
Eleventh Annual Acquisition Research 
Symposium, pp. 199–210, 13–15 May 2014, 
Monterey, CA.
The Lightly Manned Autonomous 
Combat Capability (LMACC)
Dr. Johnathan C. Mun1, Dr. Shelley Gallup1
1 Supported by funding from the NPS Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098).
Abstract
As technology continues to move forward and a continued 
emphasis is placed on construction of large ships and 
submarines, there is another possibility. Th at is to construct 
a third tier of small combatants that project power from 
the sea in contested environments and employ a “shoot 
fi rst” backed by a “second salvo.” Th ese vessels would be 
constructed based on the lessons learned from automation 
of the medium unmanned surface vessel (MUSV) Sea 
Hunter, in which most ship functions and basic navigation 
would be automated. Th e new vessel, called Sea Fighter, 
would have a crew of 15 and have a single combat mission: 
to deliver long-range precision weapons and distribute 
secondary combat functions among the pack of Sea 
Fighters and Sea Hunters. An analysis of total ship costs is 
applied in a simulation and comparison to other vessels. 
Th e simulation is transportable and can be reused to help 
determine the best possible vessel for this task.
Introduction
Multiple recent articles have highlighted the drift ing mainte-
nance availability schedules for surface ships and submarines. 
Th e primary cause of shift ing restricted availability (RAV) 
completions for scheduled maintenance is a stretched oper-
ational tempo (OPTEMPO) faced by the fl eet. Added to this 
is the strain imposed on crews in multiple dimensions (rest, 
schools, family time), and a very dynamic global environ-
ment, producing systemic problems—with symptoms such 
as collisions at sea and less-than-mission-capable platforms. 
Indeed, the recent collisions indicate that there is a problem 
with humans on manned platforms understanding the complex 
systems that watch teams need to manage in order to operate 
safely in times of time-critical decision-making. 
OPTEMPO-induced defi ciencies and managing complexity 
are just a couple symptoms pointing to a need to rethink Navy 
force structure. Prescriptions generally adjust the fl eet upward 
in the number of ships available to meet perceived near- and 
far-term global security demands, with a secondary eff ect of 
creating system slack that will enable better ship maintenance 
and personnel training. 
However, creating a 355(+/−)-ship Navy is a task with 
many multiple nested decision trees—decisions that once 
taken will shape the confi guration of the target fl eet and its 
capabilities. One such decision point involves the role of 
autonomous systems at sea. Th e U.S. Navy is indeed explor-
ing air, undersea, and surface autonomy. However, there are 
substantial hurdles.
A CNA paper from 2017 describes the role of the three 
“off sets,” with the implementation of artifi cial intelligence and 
autonomy being the third off set. 
It is the economic necessity to rebalance force structure that 
has spurred the Department of Defense (DoD) to pursue 
a Th ird Off set strategy emphasising improved human/ma-
chine collaboration through the exploitation of autonomous, 
distributed, and network-enabled systems. “Th ird Off set 
is the latest in a series of off set strategies, which are driven 
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by those numbers [and] a need to work in smarter ways,” 
Carr said. “It’s about how you get the most capability out 
of the dollars that you have. We have to stop buying fewer 
numbers of more expensive stuff .” 
As pointed out above, there is a need to embrace the 
oncoming operational and technical advances in autonomy. 
Th ese advances are problematic if not worked through at an 
operational level, with real platforms that are engaged in an 
increasingly diverse set of operational problems. Acquainting 
fl eet operators with automation technology and developing 
concepts of operations (CONOPs) along with trust in the capa-
bilities is extremely important. “Th us it likely will be necessary 
for operators and operational commanders to work with these 
systems more extensively and over a wider range of scenarios 
for such systems to become relatively predictable and acquire 
an appropriate degree of trust.” 
Sea Hunter
Th e medium unmanned surface vessel (MUSV) Sea Hunter is 
currently undergoing testing for collision regulations (COLREG) 
compliance and within limited operational concepts by Surface 
Development Squadron ONE. Th is game-changing technology 
merged onto a long-endurance platform has produced some real 
shift s in perception of a surface unmanned vessel.
However, the fi rst step is to better understand how Sea 
Hunter will fi t into the fl eet. “Frankly, the navy has to 
understand the CONOPS,” Russell said. “How we would 
use these vehicles, understanding if a technology is via-
ble enough, and what systems you might put on there to 
increase the capability of these unmanned platforms. [Th ose 
are] areas of research that we are focusing on.” 
Th ere are numerous challenges, some technical, others poli-
cy, that still need to be addressed—such as cybersecurity.
A second medium displacement unmanned surface ves-
sel (MDUSV) has been funded, which may help create some 
momentum in the direction of fl eet implementation. At the same 
time, the U.S. Navy (USN) has announced its plan to purchase a 
new class of warship, at a cost of $950 million per hull. Little ad-
ditional information could be found on this vessel, but it is likely 
to be built on precepts that will be outdated by the time they are 
delivered, and without the advances in autonomy that are likely. 
We propose considering another possibility, one that will 
create the technical, operational, policy, and CONOPs devel-
opment opportunity in concert with the third off set and be a 
potential sea change for the USN of the future, while enabling 
the relief in OPTEMPTO and continued complex missions of 
manned surface vessels.
Lightly Manned Autonomous 
Combat Capability
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) largely 
built the autonomous continuous trail unmanned vessel (AC-
TUV)—later to become MDUSV, then MUSV, and synony-
mous with Sea Hunter—as an experiment in autonomy. As it 
began to show promise, many in the USN began to rub their 
chins and ask, “Well, what do we use it for?” A lot of years have 
been spent determining what its mission set should be. Th ere 
are many problems with “potential” and “possible” as deter-
minants of capability—mainly in that they don’t exist. And 
there is a bridge to cross between fully manned (present) and 
fully unmanned (future). While we test run at these hurdles, a 
middle ground is needed for the United States’ response to the 
near peer nations and possible domination of the sea lines of 
communication (SLOCS) in the Pacifi c we are dependent on. 
Lightly manned autonomous combat capability (LMACC) 
turns “what if ” thinking on its head. It is designed to meet a 
CONOP and strategic mission as it is needed now, rather than 
built and then refi ned in a concept of operations. Th e LMACC 
has one primary mission: deliver missiles to targets ashore 
and afl oat within the fi rst island chain, while the “leviathan 
navy” waits out the fi rst round of missile exchanges to become 
the second round of mission capable delivery. Th e cruisers, 
guided-missile destroyers, and aircraft  carriers with nuclear 
propulsion will not survive the fi rst round inside the second 
island chain.
In a truly distributed maritime operations, each of these 
vessels has the primary mission above and a secondary warfare 
mission unique to that platform. Anti-submarine warfare 
(ASW) vessels, anti-air warfare vessels, and surface warfare 
vessels, for example, would be distributed among the Sea 
Fighter, and in company with Sea Hunter vessels as sensors. A 
“pack” consists of four Sea Fighters and six Sea Hunters. Th ree 
packs would be employed forward and relieved on station by 
another three packs. Th is equates to 12 Sea Fighters and 18 
Sea Hunters. Th e manned vessels would include a crew of 15 
specialists, commanded by the weapons and tactics instructor. 
Th e ship would be built around the current state of autonomy, 
which looks aft er the ship’s well-being and navigates according 
to the rules of the road.
Sea Fighter is currently being designed at Naval Postgradu-
ate School, employing innovative design for “hyper maneuver-
ing” diesel electric hybrid technology, weapon and sensors, and 
C2 capabilities that allow it to communicate over the horizon 
in a satellite degraded/denied environment. Many tactics are 
taken from the aviation community, human systems integra-
tion, and the fi eld of human-machine teaming.
Funding for this project was initiated under Navy Research 
Project funding, with N96 as its sponsor. To build this vessel 
(prototype) will take a stretch of the acquisition system, employ-
ing funding such as Joint Capability Technology Demonstra-
tions, congressional plus-up, and Other Transaction Authority 
(OTA) procurement. Nontraditional shipyards could be em-
ployed for this 1,000-ton, fully loaded vessel of less than 200 feet. 
Our fi rst design was based on an extension of the Cyclone 
coastal patrol–class that has been refi t using current auton-
omous seakeeping and mission behavior capabilities. Th is 
partially manned vessel would perform most of its mis-
sion-state behaviors (e.g., sea keeping, maneuvering, systems 
maintenance) and mission behaviors (e.g., surface intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance; patrol of sea lanes; and 
intelligence gathering) autonomously, while the limited crew 
would perform oversight, man-in-the-loop and man-on-the-
loop functions, as well as providing security. Th is would be an 
experimental but also CONOP developing system, one that 
could point the way to future ship/human teaming designs. 
As a mother ship to other autonomous systems, integration 
and interoperability of these systems could be optimized and 
focused on making these systems operationally viable. 
Other recent cost analysis included hauling out and refi tting 
an FFG-7 hull. Th e cost was put at around $450 million if it were 
to be updated for communications, weapons sensors, weapons 
systems, and habitability. If kept to the concept of autonomy, 
outfi tting the ship with required sensors to sense the environ-
ment for autonomy could be modeled on the lessons learned 
from Sea Hunter, and at a lower cost. Autonomy is not just sens-
ing the physical environment around the vessel, extracting what 
is mission-relevant; it is also the sensing of systems aboard the 
vessel. Sea Hunter has been very important in showing that sys-
tems and maintenance-related needs required to the vessel can 
be implemented and controlled by autonomy for long durations. 
In the end, our current confi guration is a new hull design 
with some innovations:
	■ Deep keel for sea keeping and attachment of ASW pod for 
this variant;
	■ Diesel-electric hybrid power plant and possible continuous 
variable transmission;
	■ Controllable pitch propellers;
	■ Forward water jet bow thruster;
	■ Unique missile launcher with overboard discharge;
	■ Internal habitability gleaned from airline industry (e.g., 
sleeping pods from fi rst class, with additional privacy);
	■ Meals taken again from airline industry for fi rst-class pas-
sengers (e.g., small galley for coff ee, heating frozen food, and 
prepping of dried food like rice, beans, etc.);
	■ Fuel bladders internal to the vessel, in addition to fuel stor-
age, to increase range—as fuel may not be available over its 
9,000-mile mission range;
	■ Rethinking of watch teams (e.g., section watches not 
required; move more to work on demand and as circum-
stances require);
	■ Sensor decision aids and emergency action messaging; and
	■ Extremely high frequency satellite communications, backed 
up by wide-area network, high-frequency internet protocol.
Literature Survey
In the NAVSEA Cost Estimation Handbook, Deegan (2005) pro-
vides a ready reference to “support the stewardship of our cost 
engineering capabilities,” while SPAR Associates (2015) “uses 
its system to quickly estimate ship costs based on initial design 
data and to provide the impact on costs of alternate design and 
build strategy decisions.”
Lee (2014) looked at improving the parametric method of 
cost estimating relationships of U.S. Navy ships. In considering 
recent military budget cuts, there has been a focus on determin-
ing methods to reduce the cost of Navy ships. According to Lee,
[A] RAND National Defense Research Institute study 
showed many sources of cost escalation for Navy ships. 
Among them included characteristic complexity of modern 
Naval ships, which contributed to half of customer driv-
en factors. Th is paper focuses on improving the current 
parametric cost estimating method used as referenced in 
NAVSEA’s Cost Estimating Handbook. 
Currently, as Lee (2014) describes, 
Weight is used as the most common variable for determin-
ing cost in the parametric method because it’s a consistent 
physical property and most readily available. Optimizing 
ship design based on weight may increase density and com-
plexity because ship size is minimized.
Th at paper introduced “electric power density and outfi t 
density as additional variables to the parametric cost estimat-
ing equation and will show how this can improve the early 
stage cost estimating relationships of Navy ships” (Lee, 2014). 
From our literature survey, we found that there are four 
common types of cost estimating methods: “Analogy, Paramet-
ric, Engineering Build-up, and Extrapolation from Actuals” 
(Lee, 2014). During the very early stages of cost estimating, 
even before the concept refi nement stage, the analogy cost 
estimating method is used. As more details emerge and more 
information is available for the cost estimator, a more accurate, 
build-up cost estimation is used. Toward the end of the ship’s 
life cycle, we can extrapolate actual cost information, and it is 
no longer an estimation. 
NAVSEA (2015) released instructions regarding the prepa-
ration of government cost estimates. Th e general methods 
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(prototype) will take a stretch of the acquisition system, employ-
ing funding such as Joint Capability Technology Demonstra-
tions, congressional plus-up, and Other Transaction Authority 
(OTA) procurement. Nontraditional shipyards could be em-
ployed for this 1,000-ton, fully loaded vessel of less than 200 feet. 
Our fi rst design was based on an extension of the Cyclone 
coastal patrol–class that has been refi t using current auton-
omous seakeeping and mission behavior capabilities. Th is 
partially manned vessel would perform most of its mis-
sion-state behaviors (e.g., sea keeping, maneuvering, systems 
maintenance) and mission behaviors (e.g., surface intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance; patrol of sea lanes; and 
intelligence gathering) autonomously, while the limited crew 
would perform oversight, man-in-the-loop and man-on-the-
loop functions, as well as providing security. Th is would be an 
experimental but also CONOP developing system, one that 
could point the way to future ship/human teaming designs. 
As a mother ship to other autonomous systems, integration 
and interoperability of these systems could be optimized and 
focused on making these systems operationally viable. 
Other recent cost analysis included hauling out and refi tting 
an FFG-7 hull. Th e cost was put at around $450 million if it were 
to be updated for communications, weapons sensors, weapons 
systems, and habitability. If kept to the concept of autonomy, 
outfi tting the ship with required sensors to sense the environ-
ment for autonomy could be modeled on the lessons learned 
from Sea Hunter, and at a lower cost. Autonomy is not just sens-
ing the physical environment around the vessel, extracting what 
is mission-relevant; it is also the sensing of systems aboard the 
vessel. Sea Hunter has been very important in showing that sys-
tems and maintenance-related needs required to the vessel can 
be implemented and controlled by autonomy for long durations. 
In the end, our current confi guration is a new hull design 
with some innovations:
	■ Deep keel for sea keeping and attachment of ASW pod for 
this variant;
	■ Diesel-electric hybrid power plant and possible continuous 
variable transmission;
	■ Controllable pitch propellers;
	■ Forward water jet bow thruster;
	■ Unique missile launcher with overboard discharge;
	■ Internal habitability gleaned from airline industry (e.g., 
sleeping pods from fi rst class, with additional privacy);
	■ Meals taken again from airline industry for fi rst-class pas-
sengers (e.g., small galley for coff ee, heating frozen food, and 
prepping of dried food like rice, beans, etc.);
	■ Fuel bladders internal to the vessel, in addition to fuel stor-
age, to increase range—as fuel may not be available over its 
9,000-mile mission range;
	■ Rethinking of watch teams (e.g., section watches not 
required; move more to work on demand and as circum-
stances require);
	■ Sensor decision aids and emergency action messaging; and
	■ Extremely high frequency satellite communications, backed 
up by wide-area network, high-frequency internet protocol.
Literature Survey
In the NAVSEA Cost Estimation Handbook, Deegan (2005) pro-
vides a ready reference to “support the stewardship of our cost 
engineering capabilities,” while SPAR Associates (2015) “uses 
its system to quickly estimate ship costs based on initial design 
data and to provide the impact on costs of alternate design and 
build strategy decisions.”
Lee (2014) looked at improving the parametric method of 
cost estimating relationships of U.S. Navy ships. In considering 
recent military budget cuts, there has been a focus on determin-
ing methods to reduce the cost of Navy ships. According to Lee,
[A] RAND National Defense Research Institute study 
showed many sources of cost escalation for Navy ships. 
Among them included characteristic complexity of modern 
Naval ships, which contributed to half of customer driv-
en factors. Th is paper focuses on improving the current 
parametric cost estimating method used as referenced in 
NAVSEA’s Cost Estimating Handbook. 
Currently, as Lee (2014) describes, 
Weight is used as the most common variable for determin-
ing cost in the parametric method because it’s a consistent 
physical property and most readily available. Optimizing 
ship design based on weight may increase density and com-
plexity because ship size is minimized.
Th at paper introduced “electric power density and outfi t 
density as additional variables to the parametric cost estimat-
ing equation and will show how this can improve the early 
stage cost estimating relationships of Navy ships” (Lee, 2014). 
From our literature survey, we found that there are four 
common types of cost estimating methods: “Analogy, Paramet-
ric, Engineering Build-up, and Extrapolation from Actuals” 
(Lee, 2014). During the very early stages of cost estimating, 
even before the concept refi nement stage, the analogy cost 
estimating method is used. As more details emerge and more 
information is available for the cost estimator, a more accurate, 
build-up cost estimation is used. Toward the end of the ship’s 
life cycle, we can extrapolate actual cost information, and it is 
no longer an estimation. 
NAVSEA (2015) released instructions regarding the prepa-
ration of government cost estimates. Th e general methods 
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described in the manual include the four most common 
methods of cost estimating: “roundtable, comparison, detailed 
estimating, and parametric cost estimating (cost estimate 
relationships).”
In his article “Budget Offi  ce Questions Navy Shipbuilding 
Cost Estimates,” Walcott (2012) fi nds that the U.S. Navy is 
underestimating the cost of its proposed 30-year shipbuilding 
program by 19 percent, the non-partisan Congressional Bud-
get Offi  ce said in a report. By comparison, using its own mod-
els and assumptions, CBO estimates that the cost for new-ship 
construction under the 2013 plan would average $20.0 billion 
per year, or a total of $599 billion through 2042.
In Integrating Cost Estimating with the Ship Design Process, 
Deschamps and Greenwell (2009) explain that the ship design 
process is an 
evolutionary process where at the conceptual design level, 
pre-Milestone A for Naval acquisition programs, few details 
are known, and the metrics used for estimating costs are 
based on analogous platforms and limited parametric func-
tions. As the design process continues towards Milestone B 
the design begins to take shape with fewer analogies and an 
increasing number of parametric cost drivers. At this point, 
80% of the life-cycle costs (LCC) are set and the cost risk as-
sociated with the design becomes an important piece of the 
overall acquisition costs. It is imperative that the methods 
used to estimate the cost and cost risk are tightly coupled 
with the design iteration process and are parametric in na-
ture in order to support the needs of the Program Manager 
in terms of not only the basic design but design trade-off s.
Th e authors present the use and benefi ts of employing a set 
of parametric cost models during the concept and preliminary 
phases of ship design. 
Th ese cost models produce quick assessments of costs and 
risk, for design and mission trade-off  alternatives. Th e cost 
models, being parametric, can follow the evolutionary de-
sign process. At early stages of the design, when many details 
of the design are not yet available, the cost models automat-
ically provide statistically-synthesized values for missing 
parameters. Th en, as the design matures, these default 
values can be replaced with values developed for the design. 
(Deschamps & Greenwell, 2009)
In A Practical Approach for Ship Construction Cost Estimat-
ing, Ross (2002) states that to succeed commercially, shipyards 
must be able to accurately estimate costs. Cost estimating is 
necessary for the “bid process, change orders, and trade-off  
studies.” Numerous cost estimating approaches exist. Th ey are 
based on extrapolations from “previously-built ships, detailed 
bottoms-up parametric models, and integrated physics-based 
analyses.” Cost estimating can be frustrating to shipyard per-
sonnel. Cost estimators may lack timely technical information 
and face data inconsistencies. 
Ship engineers and naval architects commonly lack feedback 
on the cost consequences of their technical decisions. Man-
agers oft en lack information denoting the level of confi dence 
in cost estimates upon which they must make business 
decisions. Finally, many approaches to cost estimating are 
mysterious and not formally validated (each cost estimator 
has his own black book), complicated (too time consuming 
to be of use to decision makers), or diffi  cult to use (steep 
learning curve). (Ross, 2002)
Th is paper presents an approach that enables instant sharing 
of cost and technical data among ship engineers, naval archi-
tects, and cost estimators; the analysis was meant to provide 
confi dence measures to managers. 
Truver (2001) believes that estimating ship construction 
costs is behind the times. In one highly critical area of naval 
analysis, the Navy seems to be “bogged down in the early years 
of the last century.” Th e Navy’s traditional approach and meth-
odology for estimating the construction and life-cycle costs 
of new ships is “out of step with the Revolution in Business 
Aff airs.” According to Truver (2001),
Th e Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) is rethinking 
the current paradigm of ship cost estimating. Taking the lead 
in a joint Navy-industry initiative to reinvent the way ship 
costs are determined, have developed the Product Oriented 
Design and Construction (PODAC) Cost Model. 
Additionally,
since the end of the Cold War, naval procurement for the 
U.S. Navy has seen a dramatic decrease. Th is decrease 
in defense spending has placed existing programs under 
more scrutiny than previous years. As a result, there is less 
tolerance on the part of taxpayers and U.S. Congress for pro-
curement cost growth. (Miroyannis, 2006)
Th e research attempts to examine the current method that 
the Navy conducts ship cost estimates, and it suggests chang-
es in order to improve the confi dence level and accuracy of 
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described in the manual include the four most common 
methods of cost estimating: “roundtable, comparison, detailed 
estimating, and parametric cost estimating (cost estimate 
relationships).”
In his article “Budget Offi  ce Questions Navy Shipbuilding 
Cost Estimates,” Walcott (2012) fi nds that the U.S. Navy is 
underestimating the cost of its proposed 30-year shipbuilding 
program by 19 percent, the non-partisan Congressional Bud-
get Offi  ce said in a report. By comparison, using its own mod-
els and assumptions, CBO estimates that the cost for new-ship 
construction under the 2013 plan would average $20.0 billion 
per year, or a total of $599 billion through 2042.
In Integrating Cost Estimating with the Ship Design Process, 
Deschamps and Greenwell (2009) explain that the ship design 
process is an 
evolutionary process where at the conceptual design level, 
pre-Milestone A for Naval acquisition programs, few details 
are known, and the metrics used for estimating costs are 
based on analogous platforms and limited parametric func-
tions. As the design process continues towards Milestone B 
the design begins to take shape with fewer analogies and an 
increasing number of parametric cost drivers. At this point, 
80% of the life-cycle costs (LCC) are set and the cost risk as-
sociated with the design becomes an important piece of the 
overall acquisition costs. It is imperative that the methods 
used to estimate the cost and cost risk are tightly coupled 
with the design iteration process and are parametric in na-
ture in order to support the needs of the Program Manager 
in terms of not only the basic design but design trade-off s.
Th e authors present the use and benefi ts of employing a set 
of parametric cost models during the concept and preliminary 
phases of ship design. 
Th ese cost models produce quick assessments of costs and 
risk, for design and mission trade-off  alternatives. Th e cost 
models, being parametric, can follow the evolutionary de-
sign process. At early stages of the design, when many details 
of the design are not yet available, the cost models automat-
ically provide statistically-synthesized values for missing 
parameters. Th en, as the design matures, these default 
values can be replaced with values developed for the design. 
(Deschamps & Greenwell, 2009)
In A Practical Approach for Ship Construction Cost Estimat-
ing, Ross (2002) states that to succeed commercially, shipyards 
must be able to accurately estimate costs. Cost estimating is 
necessary for the “bid process, change orders, and trade-off  
studies.” Numerous cost estimating approaches exist. Th ey are 
based on extrapolations from “previously-built ships, detailed 
bottoms-up parametric models, and integrated physics-based 
analyses.” Cost estimating can be frustrating to shipyard per-
sonnel. Cost estimators may lack timely technical information 
and face data inconsistencies. 
Ship engineers and naval architects commonly lack feedback 
on the cost consequences of their technical decisions. Man-
agers oft en lack information denoting the level of confi dence 
in cost estimates upon which they must make business 
decisions. Finally, many approaches to cost estimating are 
mysterious and not formally validated (each cost estimator 
has his own black book), complicated (too time consuming 
to be of use to decision makers), or diffi  cult to use (steep 
learning curve). (Ross, 2002)
Th is paper presents an approach that enables instant sharing 
of cost and technical data among ship engineers, naval archi-
tects, and cost estimators; the analysis was meant to provide 
confi dence measures to managers. 
Truver (2001) believes that estimating ship construction 
costs is behind the times. In one highly critical area of naval 
analysis, the Navy seems to be “bogged down in the early years 
of the last century.” Th e Navy’s traditional approach and meth-
odology for estimating the construction and life-cycle costs 
of new ships is “out of step with the Revolution in Business 
Aff airs.” According to Truver (2001),
Th e Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) is rethinking 
the current paradigm of ship cost estimating. Taking the lead 
in a joint Navy-industry initiative to reinvent the way ship 
costs are determined, have developed the Product Oriented 
Design and Construction (PODAC) Cost Model. 
Additionally,
since the end of the Cold War, naval procurement for the 
U.S. Navy has seen a dramatic decrease. Th is decrease 
in defense spending has placed existing programs under 
more scrutiny than previous years. As a result, there is less 
tolerance on the part of taxpayers and U.S. Congress for pro-
curement cost growth. (Miroyannis, 2006)
Th e research attempts to examine the current method that 
the Navy conducts ship cost estimates, and it suggests chang-
es in order to improve the confi dence level and accuracy of 
the forecasts. An examination of how industry is conducting 
cost estimates was used as a comparison to the current Navy 
practices. Finally, 
using only a weight-based approach to ship cost estimating 
is insuffi  cient. It is necessary to develop and use a model 
that incorporates other cost driving factors in order to devel-
op estimates of suffi  cient quality at the preliminary design 
level. (Miroyannis, 2006)
Smith (2008) updates one ship cost estimation model by 
combining the two existing models (the Basic Military 
Training School [BMTS] Cost Model and the MIT Math 
Model) in order to develop a program that can accurately 
determine both a ship’s acquisition cost as well as its life-cy-
cle cost. Using United States Coast Guard resources, this 
project addressed various aspects of the ship design process 
which have a direct eff ect on the cost of building a ship. 
Th is will include, but not be limited to, the cost estimation 
process, determining which design decisions have the biggest 
impact on the ship’s total cost, common pitfalls in the design 
process that lead to increases in cost, and lessons learned 
that have helped minimize the cost of a ship.
Sullivan (2011) found that the 
inability to predict ship acquisition cost accurately is a 
great impediment to budget formulation and execution for 
shipbuilding programs. It also has eroded the U.S. Navy’s 
credibility with Congress. Dramatic improvements in cost 
analysis tools are needed. Areas for improvement include 
the following: 
• Prediction of R&D costs based on system complexity, 
subsystem technology, and state of development;
• Modeling of design and construction workforce 
requirements; 
• 10 Naval Ship Design and Construction;
• Topics for the Research and Development Community;
• Modeling the cost of design tools, including confi gura-
tion, mass properties tools;
• Product Logistics Models environment;
• Modeling of ship integration and test costs;
• Assessment of the costs of facilitation of prime ship-
building contractor, principal subcontractors, and 
warfare system contractors;
• Modeling of the eff ects of concurrent workloads from 
multiple contracts at all contractors facilities;
• Assessment of cost of government warfare center par-
ticipation in development and execution; and
• Probabilistic cost analysis tools that give the range of 
estimates and the probability that the estimates will not 
be exceeded. (Sullivan, 2011)
Cost estimating tools could benefi t from an approach that 
takes advantage of the massive computing power available to-
day and also the availability of highly intelligent search engines. 
Th e principle should be that if cost data exist anywhere, the 
Navy should be able to access them. Th is means that the cost of 
any component or commodity could theoretically be queried, 
stored in the Navy shipbuilder cost database, and periodically 
updated—either from catalog information, bid pricing, or oth-
er publicly available information. Th e Navy should, according 
to Sullivan,
adapt one or more of the commercially available search 
engines for this purpose and mandate its use for all 
shipbuilding programs. Furthermore, if shipbuilders could 
continue to execute the Common Parts Catalog initiative of 
the National Shipbuilding Research Program (NSRP), the 
search engines could query this catalog for component cost 
tabulation. (Sullivan, 2011)
Moore and White (2005) used a regression approach for 
estimating procurement costs:
Cost growth in Department of Defense weapons system 
continues to be a scrutinized area of concern. One way to 
minimize unexpected cost growth is to derive better and 
more realistic cost estimates. In this vein, cost estimators 
have many analytical tools to ply. Previous research has 
demonstrated the use of a two-step logistic and multiple re-
gression methodology to aid in this endeavor. We investigate 
and expand this methodology to cost growth in procurement 
dollar accounts for the Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development phase of DoD acquisition. We develop and 
present two salient statistical models for cost estimators to at 
least consider if not use in mitigating cost growth for exist-
ing and future government acquisition programs. 
According to Brown and Neu (2008), engineering cost 
models must be reliable, practical, and sensitive to the cost and 
performance impact of producibility enhancements. A baseline 
surface combatant cost model was developed using a modifi ed 
weight-based approach. A more fl exible model will be devel-
oped in Phase 2 using automated cost estimating integrated 
tools (ACEIT). ACEIT is an automated architecture and frame-
work for cost estimating. It is a government-developed tool 
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that has been used to standardize and simplify the life-cycle 
cost estimating process in the government environment. Core 
features include a database to store technical and normalized 
cost data, a statistical package specifi cally tailored to facilitate 
cost estimating relationship development, and a spreadsheet 
that promotes structured, systematic model development 
and built-in government-approved infl ation, learning, time 
phasing, and documentation, as well as sensitivity/what-if, risk, 
and other analysis capabilities. Our task will be to adapt this 
general framework for concept development to naval ship cost 
analysis, including producibility. Cost uncertainty aspects will 
be integrated with Task 2.3.
Th e Joint Agency Cost Schedule Risk and Uncertainty Handbook 
(Cost Assessment Data Enterprise [CADE], 2014) states that the 
government cost analysis community recognizes the need to 
capture the inherent uncertainty of acquisition programs 
into realistic cost estimates to support milestone decision 
process. Programmatic, cost, schedule, and technical un-
certainties are present from the earliest concept exploration 
phase, through system development, acquisition, deploy-
ment, to operational and sustainment. Many estimating 
processes have focused on producing a single, discrete 
dollar value that in turn becomes the budget. Realistically, 
estimating processes develop a range of likely values, with 
objective and quantifi able analysis of uncertainty intrinsi-
cally embedded. Th e goal of this handbook is to introduce 
industry best practices for incorporating uncertainty into 
our estimates in order to provide decision makers with the 
information necessary to make sound, defendable invest-
ment decision. 
Th is handbook emphasizes the need to shift  away from 
estimates based solely on the best-guess of system and 
programmatic parameters and encourages the cost analyst 
to build models that address technical, programmatic, cost, 
and schedule uncertainties and view risks as interdependent, 
not separate, processes. Th e eff ective incorporation of risk 
uncertainty in cost and schedule estimates is a challenging task. 
Th is handbook is promulgated to help establish a systematic, 
structured, repeatable, and defendable process for delivering 
comprehensive estimates to government leadership to get the 
best possible capability with increasingly limited available 
resources (CADE, 2014).
Cost estimating in NAVSEA “requires accurate costs 
estimates as it is critical to achieving an aff ordable U.S. Navy 
shipbuilding program” (Deegan & Mondal, 2008). 
Th ere is signifi cant concern, both within and outside the 
Department of Defense, over the future aff ordability of the 
U.S. Navy’s shipbuilding programs. Th e increasing costs of 
these programs refl ect a variety of factors, such as lower 
production quantities, increasing weapons system complex-
ity, increasing commodity prices, and a shortage of skilled, 
workers in the shipbuilding industry. Th is article examines 
the challenges one faces when attempting to accurately pre-
dict future ship and weapons system costs. It also summariz-
es current initiatives under way within the cost engineering 
organization of the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAV-
SEA) to mitigate these challenges. Reliable cost estimates are 
important to maintaining a viable Navy. It is encouraging 
to see greater importance accorded to independent cost 
estimating within the DoN along with eff orts to understand 
and use quantitative risk analysis in making cost decisions. 
NAVSEA cost estimators are proud to be leaders in this 
endeavor. (Deegan & Mondal, 2008)
Mulligan (2008) states that 
the accepted method for estimating ship construction and 
operating costs is due to Harry Benford, a professor of naval 
architecture and marine engineering at the University of 
Michigan, and dates from the 1960s. Benford conduct-
ed regression studies with a variety of technical and cost 
parameters to arrive at basic algebraic relationships among 
cargo capacity, ship dimensions, degree of streamlining 
(block coeffi  cient), design operating speed, Admiralty coef-
fi cient, required shaft  horsepower, required engine size, and 
ship steel weight. His approach however is based on design 
assumptions which have grown increasingly less applicable.
Case Application: DDG 51 FLT III Cost Model
Th is section details an illustration of the proposed integrated 
cost estimation modeling approach. As this is only an illustra-
tion, and due to a lack of proprietary data for this fi rst phase of 
the analysis, the input assumptions are only high-level approx-
imations based on publicly available information and sub-
ject-matter expert estimates. Th erefore, the results generated 
are not to be used in any specifi c decision-making. Nonethe-
less, the approach presented is robust and valid, and with the 
correct input assumptions, it can be rerun to generate accurate 
and reliable estimates. Information and data were obtained 
via publicly available sources and were collected, collated, and 
used in an integrated risk-based cost and schedule model-
ing methodology. Th e objective of this study is to develop a 
comprehensive cost modeling strategy and approach and, as 
such, notional data were used. Specifi cally, we used the Arleigh 
Burke–class guided missile destroyer—DDG 51 Flight I, Flight 
II, Flight IIA, and Flight III (see Figure 1)—as a basis for the 
cost and schedule assumptions, but the modeling approach is 
extensible to any and all other ships within the U.S. Navy.
Overview of the DDG 51 Arleigh Burke Destroyer
In the cost analysis models, we will consider the full build of the ship, with its accoutrements such as weapons systems, electrical 
systems, radar and electronic warfare systems, communication and navigation systems, aircraft , and other extra add-ons. 
Figure 2 is a descriptive summary of the DDG 51 Arleigh Burke destroyer. Th e DDG 51 is a guided missile destroyer in the 
U.S. Navy, with a complement of up to 96 missiles and a fi ve-inch gun for naval surface warfare. Th e DDG 51 has multiple vari-
ants; in the current analysis we will consider the FLT III variant. One of the reasons the DDG 51 was selected for this analysis is 
because suffi  cient information on its acquisitions process is available, since two DDG 51 Aegis destroyers have been funded in 
Fiscal Year (FY) 2016. Th ese two ships are part of a 10-ship procurement between FY2013 and FY2017.
FIGURE 1. Overview of DDG 51 Flight III
FIGURE 2. DDG 51 Specifi cations
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DoD Spending on the Aegis Destroyer in FY2012 to FY2016
Figure 3 shows some sample acquisition budgets for DDG 51 Aegis destroyers from FY2012 through FY2016. Th e comprehensive 
DoD budget was downloaded and analyzed in the current research. 
FIGURE 3. DoD Spending and Procurement for FY2012 to FY2016
High-Level Shipbuilding Process
Figure 4 shows the high-level process fl ow of building ship hulls and sections.
FIGURE 4. High-Level Process Flow (Hull and Sections)
Information, Communication, and Technology Subprocess
Figure 5 shows the ship’s subprocess for information, communication, and technology.
Weapons System Subprocess
Figure 6 shows the ship’s subprocess for weapons systems. 
FIGURE 5. Subprocess for Information, Communication, and Technology
FIGURE 6. Subprocess for Weapons Systems
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Information, Communication, and Technology Subprocess
Figure 5 shows the ship’s subprocess for information, communication, and technology.
Weapons System Subprocess
Figure 6 shows the ship’s subprocess for weapons systems. 
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Electrical Systems Subprocess
Figure 7 shows the ship’s electrical systems subprocess.
SPY-6 Radar System
Figure 8 shows the ship’s radar subsystem’s process.
FIGURE 7. Subprocess for Electrical Systems
FIGURE 8. SPY-6 Radar System and Rework
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DoD Extras: Electronic Warfare, Decoys, Extra Capabilities
Figure 9 shows the ship’s electronic warfare, decoys, and extra capabilities subprocesses.
FIGURE 9. Subprocesses and Examples of DoD Extras
Risk-Based Schedule and Cost Process Modeling
Figures 10 illustrates how the project management tasks are incorporated into the PEAT soft ware application. Th e parallel devel-
opment of tasks 20 to 25 is where the ship’s various subsystems are incorporated into the cost and schedule analysis.
Further, Figures 11, 12, and 13 show how some of the publicly available data are collated and incorporated as assumptions into 
the PEAT soft ware (see Figure 14).
Sea Hunter Analysis of Alternatives
Figure 12 illustrates the analysis of alternatives or strategic options. Based on the pricing policy on PC 14 at the Bollinger Ma-
chine Shop and Yard, we were able to extrapolate the data for 1990 to current dollar values (2020) as shown in Figure 13 for patrol 
coastal (PC) boats. Th e Monte Carlo simulated cost shows a range of $16.4 million to $32 million, with a 90% confi dence interval 
(see Figure 14). Th e range depends on the number of ships, where there is a learning curve (i.e., cost reduces over the course of 
multiple ships). Figure 15 shows the simulated expected value of PC boats at $23.6 million. Th is corresponds to the estimated $20 
million price tag as reported by the Daily Mail, stating that 
the 132ft -long (40-metre) unarmed prototype, dubbed Sea Hunter, is the naval equivalent of Google’s self-driving car, designed to 
cruise on the ocean’s surface without a crew. Th e ship’s projected $20 million (£14.2 million) price tag and its $20,000 (£14,300) 
daily operating cost make it relatively inexpensive for the Navy. (Zolfagharifard, 2016)
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FIGURE 10. Modeling Overall Process
FIGURE 11. Cost Information on Communications and Radar Systems
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FIGURE 12. Strategic Options and Analysis of Alternatives
FIGURE 13. Patrol Coastal Cost Analysis
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FIGURE 14. 90% Confi dence Interval Cost FIGURE 15. Expected Value at $23 Million
Figure 16 illustrates another example using Congressio-
nal Budget Offi  ce (2007) data on the littoral combat ship 
(LCS) and national security cutters (NSC), as well as the 
Coast Guard (CG) variant. Th e total life-cycle costs include 
acquisition costs, cost of replacing the ship one time, cost of 
operating the ships (e.g., fuel, maintenance of structures and 
systems, and personnel costs). Option 1 explores the feasi-
bility of having the Coast Guard buy a variant of the Navy’s 
LCS—specifi cally, the semiplaning monohull—to use as its 
off shore patrol cutter. Th e rationale for this option is that, ac-
cording to some analysts, the NSC’s longer mission range and 
higher endurance might make it better suited than the LCS to 
act as a “patrol frigate,” which would allow the Navy to carry 
out certain activities—maritime security, engagement, and 
humanitarian operations—outlined in the sea services’ new 
maritime strategy. Option 2 examines the eff ects of reducing 
the number of LCSs the Navy would buy and substituting 
instead a naval version of the Coast Guard’s NSC. Option 
3 examines the advantages and disadvantages of having the 
Coast Guard buy more NSCs rather than incur the costs of 
designing and building a new ship to perform the missions of 
an off shore patrol cutter. 
Using the same approach, we can estimate using notional 
values to determine the costs of the three alternatives as pro-
posed (see Figure 17) using a life cycle of 30 years, with a single 
replacement in Year 15 (see Figure 18). Figures 19 and 20 show 
the confi dence intervals of the costs and simulated values. Sea 
Fighter has a life-cycle cost of $181.9 million versus $4.76 bil-
lion for the DDG 51 FLT III. Figure 21 shows the overlay cost 
charts of the two alternatives. 
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FIGURE 16. Modeling Using Congressional Budget Offi  ce Data
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FIGURE 17. Analysis of Alternatives for Ship Costs
FIGURE 18. Life-Cycle Cost Modeling and Simulation
FIGURE 19. Simulated Sea Fighter Life-Cycle Cost
FIGURE 20. DDG 51 FLT III Life-Cycle Cost
FIGURE 21. Analysis of Alternatives of Costs
Conclusions
Th e current research is still progressing, but preliminary results 
show a promising trajectory with the cost savings on Sea Hunt-
er. Th is current study is based on publicly available information 
and data. In addition, when necessary, rough order magnitude 
notional values were used and assumed. In addition, a standard 
hull confi guration is assumed instead of specifi c design specifi -
cations with more detailed cost data and precise modeling. 
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FIGURE 19. Simulated Sea Fighter Life-Cycle Cost
FIGURE 20. DDG 51 FLT III Life-Cycle Cost
FIGURE 21. Analysis of Alternatives of Costs
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